“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause”

“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause” is a principle of impartial judgment that Publius uses to explain why some disputes require a federal tribunal. Its force extends beyond individual fairness: when a state has an interest in the outcome, its courts may be unable to decide without bias, making impartial adjudication part of the proposed federal judiciary’s design.

The Principle in Federal Judicial Design

In Federalist No. 80, Publius argues that national courts are appropriate where state tribunals cannot reasonably be presumed impartial. The maxim applies plainly to controversies between different states and their citizens, but it also reaches certain disputes involving citizens of the same state. The relevant test is not simply where the litigants live; it is whether a government’s interest compromises the tribunal’s independence.

Claims to land under grants from different states illustrate the problem. Although the disputants may both be citizens of one state, their claims depend on competing boundary assertions by governments. The courts of either granting state could be expected to favor that state’s grant. State law might already have prejudged the question and constrained the court to rule for its own government; even without such a law, judges could naturally feel partiality toward their state’s claim. The federal forum is therefore justified by the conflict built into the case, not merely by the identity of the parties.

This reasoning fits the broader catalogue of federal judicial jurisdiction that Publius proceeds to examine: cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties; cases affecting foreign ministers and consuls; admiralty and maritime matters; and controversies involving states or citizens of different states. The maxim gives a unifying rationale for jurisdiction in disputes where neutrality is essential to public peace and the fair determination of rights.

A Wider Pattern of Conflicted Judgment

The principle also resonates with the essays’ account of how private interest can masquerade as public purpose. Publius describes Pericles as acting amid personal resentments and political pressures, with the resulting conflicts contributing to the Peloponnesian War and the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. The example does not concern a courtroom, but it exposes the same danger in another form: those who wield public authority may allow private motives to shape decisions with consequences for an entire community.

The history of the Greek confederacies extends the warning from individuals to states. After the Greek victory over Persia, Athens and Sparta became rivals and then enemies; their mutual jealousies and injuries culminated in the Peloponnesian War. Elsewhere, disputes within a weak union repeatedly invited interference and intensified internal conflict. These examples show why a political system cannot safely assume that proximity or shared history will make competing parties impartial toward one another.

In Federalist No. 7, Publius makes that point directly about neighboring states. He cites the proposition that neighboring nations tend to become enemies unless common weakness compels them to form a confederate republic whose constitution prevents neighborhood disputes from becoming occasions for aggrandizement. The maxim about judging one’s own cause belongs to this larger argument: structural safeguards are needed because neither personal virtue nor goodwill reliably removes conflicts of interest.

Institutions as a Remedy for Interest and Division

The essays contrast these recurring failures with the concord of the American constitutional deliberations. In discussing the Netherlands, Publius notes that patriots made four extraordinary attempts to reform acknowledged constitutional defects, yet could not unite the public councils behind a remedy. A proposed general tax administered by federal authority also failed. The example underscores the difference between recognizing an institutional problem and possessing a system capable of resolving it.

Against this history, an impartial federal judiciary is not presented as a denial of state authority but as a means of deciding particular disputes in which state interests are implicated. The governing idea is that a party with an interest in a controversy should not control its judgment. Applied to competing land grants, inter-state controversies, and other cases vulnerable to local partiality, the principle turns impartiality from a hope about individual character into a feature of institutional design.